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Abstract: - Nation-States and their authority referred to here as national sovereignty is
under threat from forces within the global economy. Although globalisation is considered to
be a recent phenomenon that has now attracted the attention of writers, its origins lie with
those of the nation-state as the nation-state clawed its way to dominate the international
community. Nation-states achieved their pre-eminence and dominance of the international
community on the backs of free enterprise and capitalism; and now this dependence threatens
their very existence. Now belatedly nation-states are attempting to regulate the global
economy through the IMF and the World Bank and other means. This paper examines the
effect that the global economy has upon the traditional understanding of sovereignty.
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AFTER THE PARTY, IS THERE A CURE FOR THE HANGOVER? THE
CHALLENGES OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY TO WESTPHALIAN
SOVEREIGNTY
I. Introduction
For over 300 years, Nation-States have been the most important political units in the
international system.1 Moreover Nation-States have claimed that their authority, their national
sovereignty, was a legal monopoly of power to be exercised within their geographic domain,
free from interference from external actors. Put simply their sovereignty was “absolute”, an
assertion that Nation-States vigorously defended particularly regarding their right to
legislative competence. The origins of national sovereignty can be traced as far back as the
period of the Roman Empire, where the Roman Emperor was considered absolute simply
because Rome had either through conquest or other means consumed most if not all other
forms of political communities in Europe.2

In the 16th century, Jean Bodin, a French political thinker offered the first systematic approach
to national sovereignty. 3 In his famous work, ‘Six Books of the Commonwealth’, in 1576, he
defined sovereignty as follows: ‘Sovereignty is the absolute and perpetual power of a
Commonwealth,..’4 and further ‘For he is absolutely sovereign who recognises nothing, after
God, that is greater than himself’5 and that the word sovereignty meant ‘the most high,
absolute, and perpetual power over the citizens and subjects in a commonwealth.’6 Bodin’s
emphasis on ‘absoluteness’ is clear. Its importance was that it determined who was the
1

See FRANCIS H. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY 2 (2d ed. 1986): ‘In a word, the origin and history of the concept of
sovereignty are closely linked with the nature, the origin and the history of the state.’ Hinsley believed that the
development of sovereignty required the development of the Nation-State.
2
M Olivier, Aspects of the Establishment of Sovereignty and the Transfer of Government Authority 14 SOUTH
AFRICAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1988-1989) 85.
3
Jarat Chopra, The Obsolescence of Intervention under International Law, in, SUBDUING SOVEREIGNTY,
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE, 41 & 56 (M. Heiberg eds, 1994).
4
JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY FOUR CHAPTERS FROM THE SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH, 1 (Julian
Franklin ed & trans. 1992).
5
Id. at 4.

2

sovereign and therefore absoluteness was the defining element of sovereignty. He also
described sovereignty to have two sides to it, external and internal.7

The international community was configured and is still based on the notion of supposedly
equal absolute sovereigns, therefore creating a dichotomy of absolute power domestically
within the Nation-State and limited power beyond the Nation-States’ borders aimed at
ensuring non-interference by one sovereign in the affairs of another.8 Thus what Nation-States
mean and what they desire to protect most of all, when they refer to absolute sovereignty, is
primarily that within the context of their borders their government has; ‘the competence to
organise the Nation-State’s domestic management at its own discretion...’9 In other words
freedom from external forces; political independence.

Relating the notion of freedom from external interference to contemporary developments in
the global economy, multiple trading conglomerates who are not limited by national borders
(indeed do not owe any national allegiance) have combined with technical innovations in
communications to forge forces (especially economic) that now seriously challenge the socalled “absolute” authority of many Nation-States. This phenomenon called here
“globalisation” seems not only to ignore national sovereignty but appears to be immune to the
actions of Nation-States and their attempts at regulation. Globalisation therefore poses the
greatest threat to national sovereignty in the history of the Nation-State, since it threatens the
very core of national sovereignty; the ability of Nation-States to remain independent.
6
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Globalisation has both positive and negative aspects. The negative perceptions of
globalisation are embedded in the response of Nation-States to the perceived threat of losing
their identity. The issue that the Article deals with is globalisation as a construct of the
Nation-State and seeks to address whether globalisation (specifically in the economic sphere),
has outgrown the Nation-State and now enslaves national sovereignty to foreign economic
interests and thus a gradual disappearance of the Nation-State bit by bit under economic
globalisation especially considering that globalisation of the economy relies upon large
amounts of money and capital moving across political boundaries and affects foreign
exchange, interest rates, stock market investment levels, employment levels and government
tax revenues.

Part II of the Article introduces the genesis of the globalisation threat which incidentally had
its roots in the imperialistic and hegemonic agendas of European States. The frequent
occurrence of war and changing nature of warfare in the early days of the modern NationState—standing professional armies and new warfare technology—dictated a need to devote a
great deal of financial resources to military expenditure. Imperialistic success was hinged on
military and economic resources—the ability to guarantee control of new territory against
other challengers as well as the capacity to meet the opportunities and challenges that new,
expanding markets offered. It would appear that the Nation-State initially keen to develop a
global platform for its nationalistic agendas through use of both public and private finance,
was in the end caught “off–guard” with the emergence of fully-fledged transnational
corporations in the 20th century. Part III of the Article moves the discussion from the
postulations laid down in Part II to the contemporary ramifications on the global stage that
technological change, increasing production, greater consumption and rising world trade and
9

Olivier, supra note 2, at 94. This includes such things as the capacity to formulate a constitution, to make laws
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financial flows wrought. It discusses globalisation generally with a bias to its economic
dimension. In Part IV the Article discusses the global governance and regulatory regimes
cultivated by the global forces which have had the cumulative effect of increasing the power
and influence of multilateral institutions at the expense of the Nation-State’s ability to
maintain its traditional economic aristocracy due to increasing needs for State accountability
and responsibility in an ever-increasing global environment. It should be noted that
globalisation is not a unitary process but affects each nation differently, with variances
stemming from a number of factors, including size, wealth and power.

II. The Emergence of the Nation-State and the Origins of Globalisation.
The development of national sovereignty and the development of a global community
comprised of Nation-States are so closely linked that answering the question of which enabled
the other to develop is unclear.10 Regardless of the answer to that question, the origins of both
lie in Western Europe, in the Roman Empire and the authority of the Emperor.11 The collapse
of the Roman Empire created a power vacuum in which the modern Nation-State and its
obsession with sovereignty as a mantle to ward off external pressure and cement its internal
authority then began a process of evolution with that enabled, assisted or even forced the
modern concept of national sovereignty to develop.12 The fact that not one of the emerging
political communities in Europe could assert their dominance over all other rivals, despite
obvious efforts, resulted in almost a constant state of warfare, “hot or cold”, for most of these
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communities, often against multiple enemies.13 The role of virtual continual warfare in the
development of the body politic into an executive was crucial.14 As the political communities
expanded, so did the need for centralised government.15 The rise of strong centralised
governments was a direct result of frequent warfare which created a self-perpetuating cycle of
war, expansion and war again.16 Frequent internal as well as external conflicts necessitated
the need for emerging central authority to assert itself decisively both within and without so
as to overcome other competing political authorities.17 This was also an important reason
why early theorists such as Bodin declared sovereignty to be absolute. However there was an
even more important effect of this constant state of warfare and quest for dominance within
Europe by the emerging political communities: it created the concept of a market economy
and “western” capitalism.

The introduction of gunpowder And the subsequent development of new weapons radically
changed the nature of warfare, the types of armies and tactics used by any political leader or
community. But more significantly it changed irrevocably the cost of warfare, increasing it to
the point that it bankrupted many emerging European communities.18 The fact that no single
community could obtain ascendancy created an environment that demanded constant
innovation, experimentation with tactics, weapons and military theories, but also
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experimentation with finances and developing new and more efficient means of raising and
collecting the necessary revenue for continuing their struggles.1920

As imperialistic agendas stretched public resources, European leaders became
increasingly dependent upon private finance to plug the gap between State ambition
and available public funds. States thus sought to create an environment that
encouraged the development of merchants and bankers. Bankers, arms dealers and
artisans became essential, not peripheral members of society..21
Commenting on the ‘Financial revolution’ of this era that gave birth to western capitalism,
Kennedy observes that:

Gradually, unevenly, most of the regimes of Europe entered into a symbiotic
relationship with the market economy, providing for it domestic order and a nonarbitrary legal system (even for foreigners), and receiving in taxes a share of the
growing profits from trade.22
The significance of a market economy was its dynamic nature; once it had been “created”
society was changed irrevocably.23 Alongside its dynamic nature, economic growth occurs,
because of another inherent characteristic, namely that it is/was a Darwinian style-system that
encouraged the survival of the fittest; non-profitable organisations do not survive unless there
is intervention into the market by national governments. Thus there is an adjustment of the
use of land, a reallocation of resources, capital, and labour to those who were most efficient
and profitable; a cycle that builds upon itself, since the increased resources results in greater
profits, which in turn encouraged more resources to be “reallocated” to that entity.
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As Nation-States in Europe were born, so too was globalisation, as the Nation-States’
relationship with the market economy and capitalism in Western Europe gradually became a
dependency;25 and so Nation-States, in their use of capitalism in their quest to affirm their
very existence sowed the seeds of a phenomenon that was later to chisel away at the very
foundation of their authority, their national sovereignty. At the early stage of the emergence
of Nation-States, very few could predict that corporations would become so powerful, or that
one day Nation-States would lose control not only of the global economy but much of their
own national economies. After all international trade, that is the shipment of goods from one
political territory to be sold or traded in the territory of another, was as old as Nation-States
themselves and rather then be a threat was perceived as a benefit.26

The advent of the 20th century and the technological advancements (especially in
telecommunications) that dominated the era marked a turning point for global trade.
Technological breakthroughs liberated transnational corporations from their previous
dependence on State controlled networks and patronage. So successful have transnational
corporations been in harnessing the advantages offered by technology and the opportunities
created by global trade that by the end of the 20th century, half of the top 100 economies in the
world were not Nation-States but corporations.27 International trade and corporations had
evolved far beyond the simple nature of a national firm trading in a foreign market.28 Multinational corporations [or MNC’s] as these new corporations became known, duplicated their
activities, i.e. retailing the same products and their organisations in different Nation-States
and taking advantage off lower labour costs and more liberal national environmental laws to
25
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move parts of their “manufacturing/production” process to other Nation-States. As Ponting
notes: ‘… by the 1980’s a third of all world trade took place as transactions within
transnational corporations.’29

What this did was to open up States to foreign corporations which simply relocated or set up
part of their operations enabling them to tap the resources contained therein, an important
strategy in fuelling globalisation. The rapid expansion of MNC’s and corporations in the 20th
century and their heavy involvement in international trade especially after the Second World
War was accelerated by two main factors. Firstly, the initial immaturity of technology; which
limited their ability to access new markets and thus ensured the economic ascendancy of
Nation-States over trading collectivities, with their large pool of personnel and resources, was
swept aside by technological breakthroughs. Though domestic markets, particularly those the
size of the US had initially satisfied the needs of corporations, telecommunication and
transport advancements dramatically threw open the globe by pushing down costs and
facilitating secure and instantaneous forms of communication. Once dramatic improvements
had been made in transport and communications, and importantly in the ability to market their
products, corporations quickly outgrew their national borders.30

Secondly, unlike Nation-States who were responsible for all of their citizens, corporations
were concerned for their shareholders only. Nation-States, particularly after their experience
in the Great Depression of the 1920’s sought full employment and low inflation for all their
citizens.31 Nation-States had to govern for all elements of their communities and so often had
29
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to shift resources from successful provinces to a less profitable one.32 The governing bodies
of corporations’ had a much narrower focus than national governments; the sole purpose of
corporations was to generate profit, allowing them to more easily concentrate their energies to
realise this goal. MNCs developed an efficiency that the Nation-State would not match as the
‘middle-man’ in international trade thus beginning the process of displacing the Nation-State
and its role. Conflict between Nation-States and corporations often occurred as their goals
were diametrically opposed to one another. Summing this up Gilpin observes:
Whereas powerful market forces in the form of trade, money, and foreign investment
tend to jump national boundaries, to escape political control [by Nation-States] and to
integrate societies, the tendency of government is to restrict, to channel, and to make
economic activities serve the perceived interests of the State and of powerful groups
within it.33
As a consequence of their own policies designed to further the golden goal of vibrant,
dynamic economic growth, Nation-States lost ‘control’ (Did they ever have control?) of
corporations for the simple reason it was inevitable that corporations would outgrow their
national borders or indeed any political border.34 The very nature of corporations (which
Nation-States sought to use for their own benefit) their dynamic, innovative competitiveness,
would always push corporations to expand and therefore to seek out new markets. After all a
market means greater sales and greater sales meant greater profits, the raison d’etat of
corporations.

This part of the Article as carried out a tour de horizon of the genesis of the global
phenomenon and the role of the State as midwife in the process. The discussion as sailed into
the 20th century, which marked the maturation of global trade. Although this is a rather simple
32
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explanation of the history of the growth of the international economy over two centuries, and
doesn’t include many factors such as the role of oil prices, the discussion aims to make one
point clear; Nation-States realising that corporations and the market economy would assist
them in the struggle for survival in the international community created an environment
conducive for corporations to develop. This cooperation with corporations allowed NationStates to flourish but also led to the development of MNC’s: entities that not only owed no
allegiance to Nation-States, but were now beyond their control. So in a reversal of roles,
Nation-States now sought to cooperate with one another to regulate the threat posed by
corporations.

The next issue is: how has the Nation-States sovereignty fared in the swirl of global economic
contemporary forces that it helped create? The next part of the Article will give an overview
of globalisation vis-à-vis sovereignty. It will raise the issues of the redefinition of the NationState identity, the reshaping of the fixed and firm Westphalian boundaries between the
national and international spheres and the fracturing of the statist centred monistic order.
Globalisation of the world economy with its quest for international integration arguably
provides one of the tools for the chiselling away of sovereignty by decentralising national
economies and wrestling control from the State.

III. The Globalisation Challenge to Sovereignty
As Dunne notes, “[l]ike most concepts in politics and international relations, the meaning of
globalisation is contested. This is the principal reason why it is necessary to bring
philosophical and sociological insights to bear on the study of globalisation. Since
globalisation is not apparent to our sensory experiences--though of course we may be able to
34

Do corporations really owe any allegiance to the country of their origin? Their desire for profits would suggest
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11

observe some of its effects--we need theoretical tools to guide us in framing the appropriate
kinds of questions to ask.”35 One of the more widely used working definitions is Anthony
Giddens’s suggestion that globalisation represents “the intensification of worldwide social
relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events
occurring many miles away and vice versa.”36 But beneath this accessible description lie
many layers of complexity. Globalisation is not an economic or a socio- political process, it is
both. Globalisation is a set of “intersecting processes,” with limits and trends. Globalisation “.
. . represents the perception of the world as an interconnected whole and the consciousness
that a number of issues can no longer be addressed purely at a local level.”37 Globalisation
involves the development of transnational processes, for example labour or cross-border
labour mobility and the world market with the cross-border transfer of goods, services and
capital, and exists as a developing continuum.38 In essence, globalisation is the
deterritorialisation of culture,39 and the formation of a total and integrated economic system,
stimulating political interaction between States and promoting the cultural diversity of
identity.40 Globalisation strains the ideals so that people redefine groups based on culture,
religion, moral and political values, instead of defining groups based on the division of
borders.41

Globalisation raises many troubling questions with regard to the Nation-State, the traditional
primary player in the international arena. Among these concerns ‘… are perceived fears that

35
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globalisation eradicates the identity of the Nation-State, imposes Western ideals on nonWestern nations, exploits weak Nation-States to the benefit of powerful, rich nations in
essence taking from the poor to feed the rich, dilutes national management, control and
politics in favour of international integration, and imposes an international legal process
(some may say democracy) upon individual nations through political influence and pressure,
resulting in the destruction of national culture.’42 Not surprising, sovereignty seeks to target
globalisation as the primary figure in the annihilation of national identity. Globalisation seems
to be a force that works with both common and competing interests towards the achievement
of a “minimum world order.”43 By targeting the economic sphere and steadily loosening
national governments’ economic aristocracy, globalisation has as its goal a restriction of
governmental interference and elimination of trade and financial protectionism which is
antagonistic to globalisation. Addressing the decline of the Nation-State’s economic
aristocracy, Sassen explains that:

States today confront a new geography of power. The associated changes in the
condition of the State are often described as an overall decline in the State’s
significance, especially the decline in its regulatory capacities. Economic
globalisation, for one, has brought with it strong pressures for the deregulation of a
broad range of markets, economic sectors and national borders, and for the
privatisation of public sector firms and operations.44
Globalisation is reshaping the fixed and firm boundary between domestic and international
spheres and changing our conceptions of the proper domain of domestic and international
politics and law. In reformulating the entrenched disciplinary assumptions underlying the
conceptual definitions of the national and the international, we necessarily move the concept
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of sovereignty to the foreground. There is no doubt that the process of globalisation is
transforming traditional conceptions and constructions of sovereignty; the conventional image
of Westphalian sovereignty associated with exclusive territorial jurisdiction is no longer
theoretically or empirically serviceable in the face of the internationalisation of economic and
social activity.45

The concept of the sovereign State as an entity that has exclusive jurisdiction over its territory
(with the concomitant limitation on external encroachment on its power), as well as the notion
of an internal sovereignty reflected in the internal unity of the State and its “monistic” legal
order, is under transformation. As Jayasuriya observes, ‘[t]he notion of a single unified
system of internal sovereignty has become increasingly problematic in a global political
economy surrounded by islands of sovereignty, rather than by a single, central decisionmaking authority.’46 With the globalisation of economic relations, there is a growing
incongruity between a territorial notion of sovereignty and the flow of economic activity
which disrupts the internal unity or coherence of the State.47 Increasingly, various agencies
and institutions within the State develop a high degree of autonomy and independence; this
fragmentation of the domestic order of the State is central to the development of international
forms of regulatory governance.

It is apparent that the increasing complexity of globalisation brings with it a global system of
governance and regulation. The regulatory forms have two main features. First, they are
governed by both networks of State agencies as well as multilateral institutions acting not on
behalf of the State but as independent actors. Second, the emergent international regulatory
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order is concerned with laying down standards and general regulatory principles.
Developments in both global governance and international regulation suggest the emergence
of a system of decentralised enforcement or the regulation of self-regulation in which the
Nation-State does not necessarily have the upperhand. This Article in addressing the
globalisation challenge to sovereignty will in the next part focus on global governance and
regulation of the economy and the necessary requirement of the internationalisation of State
agencies and institutions. While this two aspects go hand in hand, the Article seeks to discuss
them in two different sections so as to highlight two distinct factors, firstly the power and
influence of the IMF and the World Bank through its linkage of conditions to loans
disbursement as a means of cultivating sound economic policies especially in emerging
economies. Secondly, the fragmentation of the State, a form that sovereignty takes in an
increasingly global economy and an overview of the WTO’s role in laying down a rule based
international framework which arguably is intrusive upon certain traditional spheres of the
State’s law-making competence and freedom of action.

IV. Global Governance and Regulation
4.1. Multilateral Institutional Order and Global Goverance
Central to the global economy is the disjunction between the territorial nature of sovereignty
and the increasing global nature of economic flows. In short, the territorial jurisdiction of the
Modern State over economic life is increasingly constrained by the globalisation of economic
and social relations.48 Susan Strange, in a sophisticated analysis of these changes in the global
political economy,49 provides a two-fold argument: one, that all States--small and weak--have
had their authority and functions greatly diminished because of the integration of States into
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the global economy; and, two, that “some of the fundamental responsibilities of the State in a
market economy--responsibilities first recognised, described, and discussed at considerable
length by Adam Smith over 200 years ago--are not now being adequately discharged by
anyone.”50

The emergence of a mostly private international institutional order wherein the strategic
agents are not the national governments of leading countries, but a variety of private actors,
may well have the effect of reducing the scope and exclusivity of the State’s authority and
law-making competence. In Sassen’s words, “…this new institutional order also has
normative authority--a new normativity that is not embedded in what has been (and to some
extent remains) the master normativity of modern times, raison d’etat.”51. In Sassen’s view,
‘economic globalisation, has emerged as a key dynamic in the formation of a transnational
system of power which lies in good part outside the formal interstate system;52 Despite the
role the State retains in regulation of the economy (mainly the national economy), we are
seeing a repositioning of the State in a broader field of power and with global forces
reconfiguring the work of States. This broader field of power is partly constituted through the
formation of a new private institutional order linked to the global economy, but also through
the growing importance of a variety of other institutional orders, from the new roles of the
international network of multilateral institutions in global governance issues and transnational
regulatory frameworks.53
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One of the most important manifestation of the increase in power of non-State actors and
corresponding decrease in statal power is the international capital market.54 Although figures
vary, there is an estimated daily trade of over a trillion US dollars.55 The volume of its annual
trade is estimated to be ten [10] times the whole world’s GNP.56 The market was deregulated
in the 1960’s creating ‘stateless capital’,57 which ‘rushe[s] in and out of national financial
markets without any political regulation and unhinged for long periods from underlying
fundamentals of the real economy.’58 This market is unregulated by any Nation-State, though
multilateral institutions play an increasingly important role that even overshadows the
legislative and regulatory efforts of Nation-State governments. Both Cohen and Strange
provide a valuable analysis of the growing disjunction between the functional domain of
economic activity and territorial reach of the sovereign; from this persuasive premise, they
reach the conclusion that sovereignty is subject to a process of gradual erosion, or to use
Strange’s phrase, the “diffusion of authority from state to market.”59 Emerging forms of
“complex sovereignty” break down the internal structural coherence of the State, replacing it
with often autonomous regulatory agencies whose purpose is to meditate between the
international and the local or national.60

Another manifestation of the power and influence of non-State actors in the globalisation of
markets and the global economy is that Nation-States (especially in the Third World) are
increasingly ‘held to ransom’ by multinational corporations. Close relationships between
governments and multinational corporations give rise to profits for both the corporations and
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governments, but also importantly, the corporations exercise a great deal of influence over
governmental policy.61 Nation-States when determining domestic policies, can ignore them
but they face the risk of losing foreign capital, foreign investment and foreign technology, all
of which could have a dramatic impact on that Nation-State’s economy.

Technology by removing the importance of national borders in commerce has had the effect
that constituent units or regions of a Nation-State now are no longer dependent on their
national governments for trade. In a very interesting work, Kenichi Ohmae believes that the
Nation-State will be replaced by ‘regional economies’, communities unified by economic
reasons rather than political or cultural.62 He describes them as ‘natural business units in
today’s global economy’ that either have or desire direct access to the global market and do
not rely upon their respective national/central governments for economic assistance and in
fact wish to be free from their controls as well.63 His basic hypothesis is that national
sovereignty has been effectively weakened by the level of economic interdependence and also
by the opportunities which are made available by the global economy; Nation-States are no
longer the efficient ‘middle-man’.64 The cause for the decline of the Nation-States’ control
over their economies is due mainly to their inabilities to respond to new challenges such as
technology, which enables vast sums of capital to be transferred instantaneously and access to
information which has created increasingly universal consumer preferences (the author
describes this as the ‘Californiaisation’ of preferences); changes in industry dynamics and
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business attitudes. Also that Nation-States are burdened by outdated policies such as
maintaining the civil minimum;65 subsidies for the national interest; and protectionist tariffs.66

In seeking to circumvent the ‘inefficiency’ of the Nation-State in a bid to balance the many
common as well as competing interests of a global economy, global forces have generated an
“. . . expanding web of transnational regulatory institutions. . .,” and other multilateral
institutions, with the result that commercial activity continues to move farther away from the
Nation-State government.67 This move is reflected in the growth in power and authority of
multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, and the EU, and with
their expanding declarations, conventions, and international legal instruments. Thus, NationStates are faced with transnational commercial practices and the regulatory institutions, which
globalisation engenders. These multilateral institutions provide substitutes (albeit imperfect)
for the functions of global markets without global governance.’68 However, this leaves open
the question and concern for small, lower-income countries with only limited abilities to
comprehensively protect themselves.

The general uneasiness by weak Nation-States over the predatory tendencies of multinational
corporations is almost matched by their distaste for the increasing entrenchment of strict
conditionalities and mandatory appraisals imposed by multilateral institutions Such as the
IMF, the World Bank, the WTO and the Basle Committee of Banking Supervisors. A key
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example reflecting the authority of multilateral institutions in the global economy and the
significant leak of economic power from State to non-State actors is reflected in the role of
the IMF and the World Bank in the aftermath of the Asian Crisis. Under the arrangement of
global governance reflected in conditional aid by these two Bretton Woods institutions, the
economic policies of the Nation-State are mediated by the dictates of these institutions. The
Article now turns to consider this in the next section.

4.1.1. The IMF & The World Bank: Economic Dictatorship?
Conditionality, defined as “the linking of the disbursement of a loan to understandings
concerning the economic policy which the government of the borrower country intends to
pursue,”69 now forms a cornerstone in both the IMF and the World Bank’s financing
programmes. These conditions enable the IMF and the World Bank “independently to
examine the country’s need for balance of payments assistance and to require the adoption of
corrective policies before funds are disbursed.”70 Common conditions imposed by both
institutions include restrictions on the credit provided by domestic banks, decreasing the fiscal
deficit, depreciation of the exchange rate, and trade liberalisation measures.71 The World
Bank’s conditionality practice often exceeds the macroeconomic corrections prescribed by the
IMF as its lending has “evolved ... [in]to detailed reforms affecting the public administration
itself”72 that often affect governance issues.
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The Asian “tigers” experienced the phenomenon of loss of control over the national economy
first-hand. Three ugly features of the globalised economy were reflected in the Crisis. First,
the threat posed by international capital markets in effectively devaluing a Nation-State’s
currency; secondly the horrendous effects on the domestic economies and policies of the
Nation-State and lastly, the intrusiveness of multilateral institutions on the Nation-State’s
economic aristocracy through dictation of monetary and fiscal policies. What began as a
simple recession in Thailand turned into one of the worst global economic disasters in
history.73 Nation-States watched helplessly as the contagion74 caused widespread panic and
economic chaos in its wake. Like a row of dominoes, one by one, nations succumbed to the
contagion. By the time the worldwide crisis concluded, the currencies of such disparate
nations as Canada, Chile, and Australia had plummeted.75

Reflecting on the Asian Crisis, Tsai observes that:

The experiences during the Asian Financial Crisis exemplify how globalisation has
weakened national sovereignty and a state’s ability to defend itself against
deleterious events by foreign actors. Globalisation, particularly the speed of capital
movement and near-instantaneous communication, made nearly every country
susceptible to the contagion. States’ defensive sovereignty is threatened because they
can no longer shield themselves from the effects of events occurring outside of their
territory.76
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The Asian crisis and its effects created a situation for IMF and the World Bank’s
involvement.77 The Bretton Woods institutions believed that the conditions they placed on
lending would prevent a recurrence of the crisis.78 The two institutions sought to bolster
nations’ ability to withstand any future crises caused by globalisation and attempted to
strengthen nations’ defensive sovereignty by imposing conditions on recipient nations.
However, conditionality handicaps the debtor nations’ ability to develop their own solutions
to economic disasters, thereby infringing on their affirmative sovereignty. Thus, the
conditionality requirements imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions further exacerbated
the effects of globalisation on state sovereignty. At a minimum, conditionality limits the range
of economic policies at a debtor nations’ disposal, while, at the extreme, it forces unwilling
sovereign nations to undergo shock therapy. Effectively, with the imposition of IMF or World
Bank conditions, sovereign debtor nations are forced to abandon their chosen and preferred
course of economic development and to accept the vision of economic development that the
IMF and the World Bank impose. Global economic integration alone introduced new
challenges to traditional notions of sovereignty; however, when coupled with the Bretton
Woods conditionality, sovereignty is in a more precarious position than ever before.’79

4.2. Regulatory Regimes and Fragmentation of the State
In both spheres of politics and economics, it is apparent that globalisation is replacing the
sovereign State, and it clear that States are unable to control their own economies and
territories in the same way that was possible in the era of raison d’etat. This phenomenon is
accurately reflected in Camilleri and Falk’s view that “global processes and institutions are
invading the Nation-State and as a consequence dismantling the conceptual and territorial
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boundaries that have traditionally sustained the theory and practice of state sovereignty.”80
“Transnational civil society” has its own agendas which do not necessarily accord with
governmental agendas, but which it nonetheless pursues.81

States are being “invaded” by “global processes”—and stating that the more penetrated an
economy becomes, the more State sovereignty is undermined is not too far-fetched an
observation. One of the central aspects of the “strong” globalisation thesis is the argument
that States are no longer autonomous actors; they now find themselves embedded in a web of
institutions and regimes. Power seems to be leaking from States to non-state actors. As
Jayasuriya observes, “[o]ne of the ramifications of State fragmentation and the greater
permeability of the boundary between domestic and international domains is the emergence of
a polycentric legal order that directly contradicts the “monistic” legal order implied by an
internally unified State.”82

An example of the fragmentation or disaggregation of the State is the development of
independent central banks. Central banks are national institutions, concerned with national
matters. Yet over the last two decades or so, ‘they have become the institutional home within
the Nation-State for monetary policies that are necessary to further the development of a
global capital market and, indeed, more generally, a global economic system.’83 ‘The new
conditionality of the global economic system--e.g. the conditions that need to be met in order
for a country to become integrated into the global capital market--contains as one key element
the autonomy of central banks so that they may institute a certain kind of monetary policy.’84
80
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Sovereignty is reconfigured in the sense that it is no longer exercised within a monistic legal
and decision-making structure;85 instead, it is parceled and diffused across a range of
governmental and non-governmental authorities. Governance programs seek to build and
make transparent a whole range of regulatory institutions; but, in so doing, it is necessary first
to make these institutions more independent from central State apparatus, thereby constituting
islands of sovereignty within the State. As a process (though it does have a different
normative basis), this has some affinity with the multilevel governance of the European
polity.86

One of the important features of governance mechanisms in the global economy is the
emergence of a system of regulatory networks.87 As the State becomes fragmented, regulatory
agencies increasingly develop international connections with other regulatory agencies,
thereby taking on an “international” function.88 This reconstitution of sovereignty in a world
of rapid globalisation takes the “internal” form of fragmentation and polycentricity and the
“external” form of “network governance.” In fact, regulatory systems have become
increasingly important in the management of the global economy and pose important
challenges to our conception of the way international law is formulated and enforced; these
regulatory webs do not depend on formal international treaties or rely on international
organisations for their enforcement. In short, the emergence of an international regulatory
State depends on and requires the active participation of agencies within the State.89 Again,

85

For an exploration of these issues, see Christian Joerges, Taking the Law Seriously: On Political Science and
the Role of Law in the Process of European Integration, 2 EUR. L.J. 105, 106-35 (1996)
86
Mark Beeson & Kanishka Jayasuriya, The Political Rationalities of Regionalism: APEC and the EU in
Comparative Perspective, 11 PAC. REV. 311, 314-315 (1998).
87
JAYASURIYA, supra note 45 at 446.
88
Id., at 447.
89
Id.
24

the importance of the reconstitution of sovereignty in these new systems of global regulation
should be recognised. We can term this a form of “network governance.”90

There are two significant features which stand out. First, regulatory cooperation was driven
by the desire to protect sovereignty. Second, this cooperation could only be achieved by
internationalising regulatory agencies, thereby rupturing the internal sovereignty of the State.
Arguably, the emphasis placed on the role of the State as a regulator--which multilateral
agencies seem to have recognised--requires not a reduction in the role of the State, but rather a
restructuring of its governmental functions, shifting the “boundary between the public and
private sectors, thereby enlarging the latter, with the government’s role changing from direct
provision to regulation.”

Global processes come about in national territories, leading to a “. . . need for
deregulation and the formation of regimes that facilitate the free circulation of
capital, goods, information and services,” which in part denationalises a Nation-State
and in part shifts elements of State sovereignty to other institutions.91 As colonisation
brought sovereign legal systems and commercial codes to harmonise economics,
globalisation has to do the same and more. Though globalisation has not forced such
a severe “. . . convergence of domestic policies and institutions,” it still brings much
greater integration.92 The suggestion is that this greater integration “. . . breeds
friction and conflict rather than accord and harmony [.]”93
4.2.1. The WTO: Rule-Based International Framework
One of the most important international economic regulatory regimes is the WTO. The
purpose of the WTO is to provide a rule-based legal framework to resolve international trade
disputes. Four characteristics give the WTO a base for strong influence and authority of the
international market place, an influence which few States can match. Firstly it is a permanent
90
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organisation with its own Secretariat and administrative infrastructure.94 Secondly, its
jurisdiction is wide and in many areas covers spheres that were traditionally within the
domestic jurisdiction of Nation-States.95 Thirdly, there is a sense of certainty and uniformity
concerning the application of the agreements of the WTO; the set of agreements apply equally
to each member; and the laws and policies of each member must conform with their
obligations under the Multilateral Trade Agreements and the Plurilateral Trade Agreements.96
Finally it will administer a Trade Policy Review Mechanism which is designed to monitor
domestic trade policies and encourage cooperation between members. In order to promote
‘global economic policy-making’ the WTO will also cooperate with the IMF and World
Bank.97

It has been stated that the WTO is not intended to encroach on national sovereignty:

The WTO is in no way an assault on any country’s sovereignty. If anything it
enhances it by providing a more effective dispute settlement mechanism through
which countries can ensure that their rights are respected and by providing a
permanent forum for adopting the international trade policy agenda to the real needs
of nations.98
Similar to arguments provided by the “realists” for the European Union, the WTO strengthens
national sovereignty by collective action, but also by maintaining the equality of NationStates by restricting their external sovereignty under a centralised legal structure. However, in
order to be more effective, the WTO by implementing the Trade Policy Review Mechanism
[TPRM], goes one step further and becomes involved in the domestic policy making powers
of Nation-States, their domestic jurisdiction. The purpose of the TPRM is to increase
93
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understanding of the trade policies of the members by greater transparency using peer review.
This is done through “consultations” between the Trade Policy Review Board meeting with
members being reviewed with a report being published.99 Therefore the TRPM provides the
WTO with the potential to erode national sovereignty:

..although national sovereignty is apparently maintained intact in the TPRM, there is a
tacit acknowledgment that transparency and exposure of non-compliance is an initial
step towards facilitating policy harmonisation .. The TPRM may not represent a
pooling of state sovereignty,...it does however, represent a pool for “mirroring” state
sovereignty in relation to international trade consensus.100
The WTO by this trade consensus raises the concern that individual trading corporations will
need to refer to the WTO rather than their own national government to assist with their own
planning and policy decisions:

Questions of where sovereignty actually resides and where it should be allocated for
the most efficient and effective regulation of transnational economic activity (ie. at the
sub-state, regional, state or supranational level) will become ever more salient.101
This phenomenon is already occurring with nearly every constituent state of the USA having
official standing with the WTO and maintaining ‘trade offices’ in other Nation-States. This
trend increases economic interdependence and weakens the influence of national
governments. Thus the WTO is a potential replacement for Nation-States. It assists regional
economies to maximise their wealth and adds a degree of protection by regulating their trade,
something Nation-States are increasingly unable to do.
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V. Is the End of the Nation-State Nigh?
Globalisation is not the only threat to the Nation-State and sovereignty. The Westphalian
system faces environmental disasters, illegal migration and mass exodus of refugees, wars,
non-national terrorist organizations with potential access to biological weapons, and of course
nation-state controlled nuclear weapons. Such threats are beyond the ability of even the most
powerful nation-state to face alone, and instead require the cooperation of nation-states.102
(Even then there is the possibility of the so-called “rogue state”.) Further, technology has
made it possible for economic entities, such as MNC’s to treat the entire globe as one
“internal market” which has severely reduced Nation-States’ financial ability to solve these
problems.103 So it is easy to understand why some commentators have predicted the end of
the Nation-State.104

However, one author believes that globalisation really signals the end of the present structure
of the international community, rather than an end to the Nation-State.105 Instead the author
sees the nation-state surviving to become an intermediary between regional entities (“superstates”) such as the EU, and NGO’s.

However, it will always remain the function of the state to transport values from the
domestic order to the supra-national and international legal orders, as well as to be
open to input from the international orders to the domestic scene.106
The importance of NGO’s, such as the World Bank and the WTO, in the international
community is well-documented above. The significance of these NGOs as well as MNCs as
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major players in the international arena is further manifested by their representation and
attendance at major government summits whether regional or international. In addition, they
are affected indirectly and sometimes directly by norms of public international law whether it
be in terms of their operations or interaction with other entities. A sore point though is that
despite being a affected by norms of public international law, these entities do not have
recognised international legal personality. 107 Such a denial has important disadvantages for
international organizations, since it denies these entities “relevance” and the ability to directly
participate in the development of international law108 Concomitantly, it has important
advantages for Nation-States, the prime fountain of international law norms by giving them an
upper hand in setting the agenda or at the very least influencing it.

The denial of NGOs and MNCs of a direct role in contributing to the norms of the
international system cannot last forever. In the Reparations Case the ICJ stated that ‘the
subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent
of their rights’ and affirmed that the UN did have standing to bring an action before the ICJ in
order to enforce its rights.109 There have also been consistent calls for international
organisations such as the World Health Organisation to be granted international legal
personality.110 Nation-States have however stood firm against de jure grants of international
legal personality to entities other than states aiming to protect the statist driven international
system by limiting the rights of participation and contribution of non-state entities. However,
107
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this state of affairs has developed significant cracks. Certain NGOs have developed de facto
vestiges of international legal personality. The fight against the influence of MNC’s and
NGO’s is a fight that nation-states will finally lose. Concessions that are granted from time to
time based on “pragmatism” will eventually become cemented in practice and cross from their
shadowy grey-area habitat as implicit rules of expedience into a black-white habitat as explicit
rules of operation and interaction. Indeed if Nation-States are to survive this onslaught then
they need to adapt, to bend before the wind, and the first step would be to acknowledge the
international legal personality of non-nation-state actors in the international legal system.111

Another way for nation-states to survive is through the formation of regional trading entities
such as the EU. This is Kenichi Ohmae’s work; he believes that the nation-state will be
replaced by ‘regional economies”, communities unified by economic reasons rather than
political or cultural.112 This phenomenon has already begun in Europe with the development
of “super-regions”.113 For example, Padania in Northern Italy;
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and in France the Rhone-

Alpes area, with Lyons its capital, the so-called ‘Alpine Diamond’ which by-passes Paris and
has virtually an independent commercial policy.115 Other regional areas are developing their
own state-like bureaucracies and developing their own infrastructures to access the global
economy directly.116 By shifting the physical border to its furthest extent, the EU overcomes
this problem, by simply engulfing these smaller economic regions into one physical entity
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controlled by one super central government in Brussels. As national governments’ policies
become increasingly subservient to regional economic controls or legislative bodies, then this
creates the opportunity for ethnic groups, ‘peoples’, to refer not to the national governments
that once united them, but to regional governments, thus accelerating the decline of the
importance of national sovereignty.

Ohmae concludes: -

In today’s borderless world, the lesson for central government is clear: hold onto
economic control too long, and it becomes worthless. Burdens increase, and no one
will pay for them but you. Give it up early, however, or better, transmute it into one or
another form of catalysis, and the global economy will rush in to help.117
In other words nation-states will become nothing more than service providers, some sort of
technology guardians, maintaining and supplying the necessary infrastructure to enable these
areas continued access to the global economy.

VI. Conclusion
From the foregoing, it is clear that the process of globalisation has transformed the traditional
understandings of sovereignty and its embranglement with specific and exclusive jurisdiction
over a given territorial area. The erosion of the internal sovereignty of the State is perhaps the
first noticeable manifestation of the transformation of sovereignty. This is particularly the
case because a key feature of the Westphalian model (and critical to the separation of the
public and private in capitalism) is the internal unity of the State, which in turn implies a
monistic legal order. Externally these changes in the form of sovereignty have been evident in
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the emergence of global governance standards and regulatory regimes all of which are
governed by a network of multilateral institutions.118

The State still continues to dominate international political interaction but in modes and forms
that are shaped by global forces. State sovereignty, is in the process of a significant
transformation, at least among States that wish to reap the benefits a global marketplace can
provide.119 The emergent, often imposed, consensus in the community of states to further
globalisation has created a set of specific obligations on participating States. The State
remains as the ultimate guarantor of the “rights” of global capital, in other words, the
protection of contracts and property rights. Thus the State has incorporated the global project
of its own shrinking role in regulating economic transactions.120 Firms operating
transnationally want to ensure the functions traditionally exercised by the state in the national
realm of the economy, notably guaranteeing property rights and contracts. 121

Globalisation has resulted in a significant reconfiguration of national sovereignty. Though
sovereignty still manifests the highest or the supreme authority within a political community,
it has lost its all encompassing nature especially in the economic sphere as governments have
increasingly been sidelined as the ultimate monetary and fiscal policy makers.122 As
technology continues to advance and fuel globalisation, the nation-state finds itself caught in
the eye of a storm, it can either seek to put in place laws to facilitate an effective harnessing of
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the benefits or it can choose to participate directly as a player, but with the critical
disadvantages discussed above. Globalisation is not inhibited by political borders while
technology renders geographic distance to be less relevant. The Nation-State is not only
losing its many multi-faceted tentacles, but it is forced to participate in the very process that is
responsible. So long as wealth or ownership of wealth can be transferred electronically, then
globalisation will continue to be the driving force behind the threat to Westphalian
sovereignty. However in a resource-strapped and overpopulated world of the future, the need
to protect scare and valuable resources such as water will require that a sovereign’s authority
be expressed territorially: it will not be enough that the owner is a corporation or an individual
is located on another continent to ensure such protection, the sovereign’s presence in the form
of an armed guard will be required. Such dominance will in all likelihood spur a cycle of
military escalation and conflict. In such an environment, Nation-States and their centuries old
alibi of sovereignty expressed as protection of national interest may return simply because of
their proven superior martial organisation.123
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